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6.1    Introduction
The dramatic increase in life expectancy at older ages and the trend toward 
earlier withdrawal from the labor force are changing the age composition 
of the labor force in many European countries, but especially in Italy. The 
Lisbon declaration (2000) by the European Union (EU) has emphasized 
the importance of increasing labor supply by setting an ambitious target 
participation rate of 70 percent for the working-  age population. Besides 
women, the segments of the Italian population that are furthest away from 
this target are the youth and the elderly. As for the elderly, the ﬁ  nancial 
incentives of the Italian social security system have encouraged retirement 
at relatively young ages throughout the 1980s and most of the 1990s (Bru-
giavini and Peracchi 2003, 2007), and only recently have these trends shown 
some sign of reversal.
We have shown in previous work (Brugiavini and Peracchi 2007) that the 
welfare gains of the elderly are large both in absolute and in relative terms; 
that is, relative to other demographic groups, particularly the young. The 
issue that we address in this chapter is whether early exit prompted reduc-
tions in the youth unemployment rate, as is often claimed by union leaders, 
thus partly compensating for the welfare redistribution operated in favor 
of the elderly. This question necessarily relates to the labor market poli-
cies enacted during the last decades and the impact that these had on the 
participation rate of younger workers. The aim of this chapter is to analyze 
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the interaction of these policies and the social security legislation in shap-
ing the age proﬁ  le of the labor market and the trends in labor force partici-
pation.
6.2      Unemployment Trends in Italy
The Italian labor market is characterized by relatively high unemployment 
rates, particularly for the young. The two main characteristics of the youth 
unemployment rate in Italy are (a) an extraordinary regional variability and 
(b) a high percentage of ﬁ  rst-  job seekers among the unemployed young, 
particularly in the southern regions.
Figure 6.1 shows the trend in unemployment rates of young people (aged 
twenty to twenty- four) between 1977 and 2004, both in aggregate terms and 
separately for males and females. The vertical bars indicate the years of the 
main reforms in the social security system. The youth unemployment rate 
shows a clear upward trend with a strong cyclical component and reaches 
a ﬁ  rst peak of 28.6 percent in 1987 and a second peak of 32.5 percent in 
1998. It is clear that Italy is a country with a serious youth unemployment 
problem.
The large variability across regions is documented in ﬁ  gure 6.2, which 
distinguishes ﬁ  ve regions: northeast (NE), northwest (NW), center (C), 
southeast (SE), and southwest (SW). While in the southern regions, the 
unemployment rate for the age group twenty to twenty-  four can be as high 
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as 50 percent, northern regions witness youth unemployment rates below 20 
percent, and for the regions in the northeast, even below 10 percent.
Several explanations have been put forward to interpret these ﬁ  gures. One 
strand of the literature looks at the issue of labor mismatch. In particular, 
some authors have explored the hypothesis that the unbalanced evolution of 
labor demand and supply across diﬀerent geographical areas (i.e., regional 
mismatch) is partly responsible for the increase in aggregate and youth 
unemployment, particularly in the southern regions.1 According to this view, 
the determinants of the regional unemployment diﬀerential can be seen in 
the following elements: employment performance in the south has worsened 
in the presence of a sustained labor force growth; labor force mobility from 
the south to the northern and central areas has sensibly declined with the 
reduction of earnings diﬀerentials and with the increase in social transfers 
per head; and real wages in the south are not aﬀected by local unemploy-
ment conditions but depend on the unemployment rate prevailing in the 
leading areas—that is, northern regions (Brunello, Lupi, and Ordine 2001). 
In other words, despite the increasing unemployment in the south, labor 
mobility from the south to the north has been low, and relative wages have 
not adjusted to reﬂ  ect worsened local labor market conditions.
Fig. 6.2    Trends in the regional youth unemployment rate
1. See Attanasio and Padoa- Schioppa (1991), Bodo and Sestito (1991), and Manacorda and 
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Together with the regional mismatch and the lack of geographical mobil-
ity, the skill mismatch also plays a role in determining high youth unemploy-
ment rates in Italy. Some authors (see, for example, Caroleo [1999]) stress 
the fact that despite the higher educational attainments of the new entrants 
into the labor market, the educational mix does not match well to the trends 
in labor demand.
Figure 6.3 shows the time trend in the percentage of people with high 
school diplomas and university degrees among people aged twenty to 
twenty- nine. This percentage has increased sharply over the last thirty years. 
The percentage of people with high school degrees has nearly doubled, from 
less than 30 percent in 1977 to almost 60 percent in 2004. During the same 
period, the percentage of people with university degrees has increased by 
nearly three times, from about 7 percent to almost 20 percent. The increase 
in the educational attainments of the younger cohorts implies a delayed 
entry into the labor market (Contini 2005). It also gives rise to problems of 
mismatch between skills supplied and skills demanded. The relevance of 
these problems diﬀers across regions (Caroleo and Mazzotta 1999). In the 
southern regions, the mismatch between skills supplied—often generic and 
of low qualiﬁ  cation—and skills demanded is just one of the explanations 
of youth unemployment. On the other hand, in the northern and central 
regions, skill mismatch seems to represent the main problem. In this case, 
employers ask for specialized manual workers, whereas young suppliers oﬀer 
a medium-  high, but generic, educational level.
Fig. 6.3    Trend of educational attainments: Rate of high school diploma and uni-
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Another element that has been often considered in explaining the high 
level of youth unemployment in Italy is the high reservation wage of the 
young, particularly in the south. This high reservation wage—combined 
with the fact that particularly in the south, the majority of the unemployed 
young are ﬁ  rst-  job seekers—is surely a relevant determinant of the high 
youth unemployment. It is generally agreed that the absence of welfare sup-
port for ﬁ  rst-  job seekers (i.e., the absence of minimum income provisions 
and unemployment beneﬁ  ts) and the strengthening of the role of the family 
have contributed to increasing the level of the reservation wage of young 
job seekers. Moreover, particularly in the south, the public sector has repre-
sented for a long time the only access to a “regular” job, and young people 
have built their own human capital and their own aspirations on this type of 
job. Consequently, their reservation wage is built on the level of wages in the 
public   sector (Caroleo and Mazzotta 1999).
The existence of a legal minimum wage is usually regarded as a bar-
rier to the recruitment of young workers. The situation in Italy represents 
somewhat of a paradox. In fact, Italy has no legal minimum wage. On the 
other hand, wage increases, especially in the public sector, depend mainly 
on seniority. The combination of these two features is often viewed as an 
important cause of the dramatic increase in the wage diﬀerential between 
younger and older workers observed during the last two decades. Instead 
of inducing a natural substitution between older and younger workers, the 
existence of this wage diﬀerential is often taken as a justiﬁ  cation for early 
retirement policies, especially in the case of industries aﬀected by negative 
sectoral shocks, which have only caused a dramatic exit of older workers, 
with little incentives for new entry of younger workers (Contini 2005).
A very popular explanation for the rigidity of the Italian labor market 
is its institutional features, especially the strictness of the Italian Employ-
ment Protection Legislation (EPL). The available empirical evidence about 
the eﬀects of the EPL on aggregate labor dynamics2 indicates that the EPL 
aﬀects the composition of employment. In particular, countries like Italy 
where the EPL is stricter tend to display higher youth unemployment.3 Fig-
ure 6.4 shows the relationship between youth unemployment and an index 
of EPL strictness for some European countries in 2003. The index we use is 
Version 2 of the overall EPL strictness index computed by the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in its 2004 Employ-
ment Outlook. Although Italy had been scoring at the highest level until the 
late 1990s, the changes to the temporary employment legislation introduced 
in the last two decades have somewhat lowered its EPL index. Table 6A.1 
in the appendix shows the EPL index and its components as computed by 
the OECD in its 1999 and 2004 Employment Outlook. We report data for 
2. See, for example, Bentolila and Bertola (1990) and Bertola (1999).
3. See OECD (1999) for a survey on the main empirical evidence about the eﬀects of the 
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Italy and a few other European countries (France, Germany, Spain, and 
the United Kingdom). It is clear that the Italian EPL is particularly restric-
tive on two dimensions: namely, “temporary employment” (although things 
improved substantially between the late 1980s and 2003) and “collective 
dismissal.”
The “young in, old out” paradigm has been advocated in Italy mainly 
by trade unions and left-  wing parties. With reference to the social security 
reforms of the 1990s and the more recent enactment of these reforms, one 
leading Italian trade union has argued that “one should not forget that rais-
ing the retirement age implies, not only that workers will be forced to work 
longer, but that two million jobs for the young will be lost.”4 Furthermore, 
the left-  wing party “Rifondazione Comunista” claims that “the intergen-
erational exchange can be interpreted as the 50-  years-  old generation leav-
ing their good jobs for the young. Would that be so dramatic for the social 
security administration? We do not think so.”5
Although Boldrin et al. (1999) clearly argue that the “lump of labor” story 
is not operating in Europe, one could get the impression that a “young in, 
old out” policy was pursued in Italy in the years between 1985 and 1990 as a 
result of the incentives for ﬁ  rms to hire younger workers (Contini and Rapiti 
1999) and the incentives for workers to retire at very young ages (before age 
Fig. 6.4    EPL index and youth unemployment rate in Europe
4. Circolare Cobas, October 2003.
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ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve) due to the lack of any actuarial penalty on pension beneﬁ  ts. The 
overall eﬀect on total labor force participation was basically close to zero, 
as the inﬂ  ow of new workers balanced out with the outﬂ  ow into retirement. 
However, this substitutability between workers of diﬀerent age groups seems 
only temporary and in any case not “endogenous” but driven by separate 
determinants and partly by the business cycle. Indeed, the explanations for 
the changes in labor force participation, and particularly its composition, 
have been less straightforward after the year 1990.
One interpretation starts from the observation that two contrasting trends 
have taken place: after a period of “jobless growth” during the 1980s and 
mid- 1990s, a total reversal occurred, such that labor markets appeared fairly 
lively in contrast with a stagnant economy and an output growth close to 
zero.
Some authors (Boeri and Garibaldi 2007) have referred to a “honeymoon 
eﬀect” of labor market policies in creating such discrepancies in observed 
patterns of employment and unemployment data on the one hand and out-
put data on the other hand, taking eﬀect well after the onset of the labor 
market reforms.
The claim of Boeri and Garibaldi is that there is a link between growthless 
job creation and the asymmetric labor market reforms in EPL carried out 
in several European countries in the 1990s. In fact, such reforms introduced 
in Italy a two-  tier system, as the labor market became more ﬂ  exible mainly 
through a series of marginal reforms that liberalized the use of temporary 
(ﬁ  xed term) contracts while leaving unchanged the legislation applying to 
the stock of workers employed under permanent (open-  end) contracts. 
These authors emphasize that the changes of EPL and their impact on labor 
demand do not produce any sizeable, permanent employment eﬀects.6 The 
mechanism is that the reduction in EPL is bound to increase employment 
variability over the business cycle while not having any permanent eﬀect on 
average labor demand. This is because EPL aﬀects the incentives to both 
hire and to dismiss workers, and there is no reason to expect a priori that 
one eﬀect could dominate the other.
Finally, some attention has to be devoted to reforms to the educational 
system, which have fostered the growth in school attendance—particularly 
at the university level. In 1969, a reform was passed that allowed access to 
the university from any secondary school; previously, only students coming 
from a “lyceum” could access. In the appendix, we present evidence7 for two 
groups of people: the “treatment group” is comprised of people who could 
beneﬁ  t from the reform, as they were around age twelve at the time of the 
reform (young cohorts), while the “control group” is comprised of people 
6. See also Bentolila and Bertola (1990) and Bertola (1990).
7. The data set used is the Survey of Income and Wealth, conducted on behalf of the Bank 
of Italy for several years.174        Agar Brugiavini and Franco Peracchi
who could not beneﬁ  t, as they were much older. In ﬁ  gures 6A.1 to 6A.3, we 
look at the status of these people well after the university age. In particular, 
we are interested in the diﬀerence in the prevalence of people by educational 
attainments. It is clear that the educational reform of 1969 has encouraged 
people to obtain a secondary school “diploma” and also a university degree 
(laurea). This is particularly evident for women.
6.3      Main Features of the Social Security System
The Italian social security system is based on a variety of institutions 
administering public pension programs for diﬀerent types of workers 
(private-  sector employees, public-  sector employees, self-  employed, and 
professional workers).8 All programs are of the unfunded pay-  as-  you-  go 
(PAYG) type. Despite a process toward convergence during the 1990s, the 
various programs maintain quite diﬀerent rules.
Currently, about two-  thirds of the labor force is insured with the Na-
tional Social Security Institute (INPS). The institute is responsible for a 
number of separate funds, of which the most important covers the private-
  sector nonagricultural employees (Fondo Pensioni Lavoratori Dipendenti 
or FPLD). Because the basic aspects of the system are well documented 
elsewhere (see Brugiavini [1999], Franco [2002], and Brugiavini and Peracchi 
[2004]), we describe very brieﬂ  y its main rules (eligibility, pensionable earn-
ings, beneﬁ  t computation, indexation, and taxation of beneﬁ  ts).
Starting in 1992, a sequence of legislated changes thoroughly modiﬁ  ed the 
social security system, originally designed in 1969. The main reforms took 
place in 1992, 1995, and 1997. They are known, respectively, as the Amato, 
Dini, and Prodi reforms, from the names of the prime ministers at the time. 
In addition, smaller changes to the system have been made nearly every 
year since 1992. Of the three main reforms of the 1990s, the Dini reform ap-
pears as the most radical, because it completely redesigns the system by 
modifying the eligibility rules and by changing the beneﬁ  t formula back 
from deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  ts to deﬁ  ned contributions, which was the type of for-
mula in place prior to 1969. However, because it will only be introduced 
gradually through a very long transitional period, the direct eﬀects of the 
Dini reform may be considered small compared to the less radical Amato 
reform.
Overall, because of the long transitional periods, the cohorts that reached 
the retirement age during the 1990s and those currently retiring remained 
largely unaﬀected by the reforms of the 1990s, as most of the burden of 
8. “Social security system” and “pension system” in this chapter are used as synonyms. In 
fact, in Italy, social security is the main source of publicly provided income in old age. Contri-
butions are compulsory for employers and employees, and beneﬁ  ts are earnings related. There 
is only a minor ﬂ  at component granted to very old people (over sixty- ﬁ  ve) under means testing 
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the adjustment fell on the younger cohorts (Franco 2002; Brugiavini and 
Galasso 2003). More precisely, the 1992 (Amato) reform explicitly distin-
guished between workers with at least ﬁ  fteen years of contribution at the end 
of 1992 and all other workers. The old system (introduced in 1969) applied, 
with some changes, to the former, whereas the new system only applied to 
the latter. The adoption of diﬀerent rules for older and younger workers was 
maintained in the subsequent 1995 (Dini) reform and 1997 (Prodi) reform. In 
particular, with the exception of the new eligibility rules, very few changes 
applied to workers with eighteen or more years of contribution at the end 
of 1995 beyond those already introduced in 1992.
The following list of legislative changes highlights the exogenous varia-
tions in beneﬁ  ts envisaged by the reforms that are potentially relevant to our 
study and that in an ideal data set could be identiﬁ  ed. We limit ourselves 
to the years 1976 to 2004, corresponding to the sample period, and focus 
particularly on changes that aﬀect the decision to retire—hence, particularly 
on changes to eligibility rules.
•   In 1992 (Amato reform), the age requirement for an old-  age pension 
gradually increased by one year of age every two years, starting from 
1994, until reaching age sixty-  ﬁ  ve for men and age sixty for women in 
2002.
•   The new requirements for an old-  age pension (age sixty-  ﬁ  ve for men 
and age sixty for women) applied starting in 1994 to managers and 
self-  employed workers. Also in 1994, the requirement was set at age 
sixty- ﬁ   ve for central government employees (irrespective of gender) and 
age sixty for local government employees (again, irrespective of gender). 
The old requirements remained unchanged for a few special categories 
(army and police personnel, ﬂ  ight personnel, traveling personnel of 
public transportation services, ﬁ  remen, and employees of the entertain-
ment industry).
•    The number of years of contribution required for an old-  age pension 
gradually increased by one every two years, starting from 1993, until 
reaching twenty years of contribution in 2000.
•    For workers with less than ﬁ  fteen years of contribution at the end of 
1992, the reference period for computing pensionable earnings gradu-
ally increased until it included the whole working life, with past wages 
adjusted to inﬂ  ation on the basis of the annual rate of change of the 
cost-  of-  living index increased by 1 percent.
•    New rules for combining pensions and earned income applied to pen-
sion granted after 1992: seniority pensions now could not be combined 
with earned income, whereas disability and old-  age pensions could be 
combined, but only partially. The possibility of combining seniority 
pensions with income from self- employment was subsequently reintro-
duced in 1993.176        Agar Brugiavini and Franco Peracchi
•    Pensions were automatically adjusted only to the changes in the cost 
of living.
•    In 1995 (Dini reform), the payroll tax rate increased from 27 percent 
to 32 percent.
•   There was a gradual introduction of an age limit for seniority pensions, 
equal to age ﬁ  fty-  seven for both men and women in the year 2008.
•    A new deﬁ  ned contribution (DC) system based on notional accumu-
lated contributions applied to workers who started their career after 
1995.
•    A “proquota” system applied to workers with less than eighteen years 
of contribution at the end of 1995.
•    After 1995, the main changes were an acceleration in the introduction 
of the age limit for seniority pensions and further harmonization of 
the pension rules for public-  sector and private-  sector employees.
6.4      Labor Market Legislation and Reforms
The rigidity of labor market rules in Italy goes back to 1966 when legis-
lation on unfair dismissals established that employers had either to reemploy 
the worker or pay him or her a generous severance lump sum. The pay-
ment was higher for ﬁ  rms with more than sixty employees. An important 
change took place in 1970 (Statuto dei Lavoratori) establishing that ﬁ  rms 
with ﬁ  fteen employees or more had to hire back workers undergoing unfair 
dismissal and also pay them the foregone wages, while ﬁ  rms below ﬁ  fteen 
employees were totally exempted from this rule.
The changes to the labor market legislation between 1970 and 2004 can 
be divided into four main periods (Boeri and Garibaldi 2007): pre-  1985, 
between 1985 and 1997, between 1997 and 2003, and post-  2003.
As for the ﬁ  rst period, an important change occurred in 1985 when special 
hiring conditions were granted to ﬁ  rms for contracts that envisaged on- the-
  job training (“contratti formazione lavoro”). These were clearly aimed at 
reducing youth unemployment, and indeed, hiring of younger workers (age 
twenty- ﬁ   ve  or  less)  became  sizeable,  particularly  in  the  industrial  sector.
The second period goes from 1985 to 1997. This is characterized by a 
wider use of ﬁ  xed term contracts (if allowed by industry-  level collective 
agreements) and a reorganization of public employment agencies (Law 
28/2/1987, number 56), which in principle should guarantee a more eﬃcient 
matching process.
The ﬁ  rst important landmark was the 1997 reform known as the “Treu 
Package.” This included a reduction of the penalties occurring in the case 
of violation of the ﬁ  xed term contracts’ discipline (conversion of ﬁ  xed term 
contract into an open-  ended one). It allowed for temporary work agen-
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encouraged by reducing social security contributions and pension provi-
sions into open-  ended ones. The package also made it easier to rely on 
apprenticeship and work-  training contracts and set further incentives for 
on- the- job  training.
A fourth period started with the “Biagi Law” of 2003. New types of labor 
contracts came into life: job on-  call, job sharing, supplementary work, and 
“lavoro a progetto,” which slightly tightened the regime for the already exist-
ing short-  term contracts (known as “Co.co.co”).
Overall, the Treu Package and the Biagi Law regulated in a less restrictive 
way the labor market and opened the way to temporary contracts.
6.5      Descriptive Evidence on the Italian Labor Market
This section brieﬂ  y describes the data sources used in the chapter and the 
way we constructed the key variables for the analysis. It then presents some 
descriptive evidence on the Italian labor market.
Our main data sources are the Labor Force Survey (Indagine sulle Forze 
di Lavoro) or LFS, conducted by the Italian National Statistical Institute 
(ISTAT), and the Survey of Household Income and Wealth (I Bilanci delle 
Famiglie Italiane) or SHIW, conducted on behalf of the Bank of Italy.
6.5.1      The LFS Data Set
The Labor Force Survey is a quarterly longitudinal survey that was ﬁ  rst 
conducted in 1959. It was carried out every second working week of each 
quarter (i.e., January, April, July, and October) until 2004. From 2005, it is 
carried out continuously during the year. The Labor Force Survey covers 
300 thousand households and 800,000 individuals distributed in 1,351 Ital-
ian municipalities. In this chapter, we use the quarterly Labor Force Survey 
data from 1977 to 2004.
The statistical units are de facto households, and the questionnaire is 
administered to all household members who are more than ﬁ  fteen years of 
age. The classiﬁ  cation of the individuals by employment status is based on 
the status that individuals self-report and on a series of answers regarding 
the job activity of the respondent during the week before the interview. 
Moreover, the classiﬁ  cation of the respondent is constructed following a 
hierarchical process: ﬁ  rst, the employed are identiﬁ  ed; second, among all 
the nonemployed, the job seekers/unemployed (both previously employed 
and ﬁ  rst-  time seekers) are identiﬁ  ed; ﬁ  nally, all the remaining individuals 
are classiﬁ  ed as out of the labor force.
The deﬁ  nitions and classiﬁ  cations used in the Labor Force Survey are 
based on the principles stated by the International Labour Oﬃce in 1982, 
and are the result of the harmonization process that makes them comparable 
with the ones adopted by the European Union. In particular, the deﬁ  nition 178        Agar Brugiavini and Franco Peracchi
of “unemployed” has changed during the years. First, in 1984, the deﬁ  nition 
of “job seeker” was changed to capture the criterion of self-  reported “will-
ingness to work.” In 1986, the deﬁ  nition was restricted to those individuals 
who self-  reported to have actively searched for work. Finally, in 1992, the 
job-  search period of the unemployed was limited to thirty days before the 
interview date.
6.5.2      Trends in the Labor Force
By making use of the diﬀerent waves of the LFS, we can trace out the 
trends of the activity rates and of the employment/unemployment rates for 
diﬀerent age groups in the population. In particular, these groups are as 
follows:
•   Young: people aged twenty to twenty-  four
•   Prime age: people aged twenty-  ﬁ  ve to ﬁ  fty-  four
•   Old: people aged ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  four
However, we can look at ﬁ  ner disaggregations by age group, which may be 
relevant for certain aspects of the labor market (e.g., distinguish the group 
aged ﬁ  fteen to nineteen from the group aged twenty to twenty-  four). One 
advantage of our data sets is that we can also exploit, both for the LFS and 
the SHIW sample, important regional variations in the Italian labor market. 
In particular, we distinguish ﬁ  ve geographical areas: northwest, northeast, 
center, southwest, and southeast.
The most intuitive description of the labor force trends by age group is 
provided by the time series presented in levels. One point to be stressed is 
that the labor force series have a break in 1993 due to the recording meth-
ods: the Italian Statistical Oﬃce has revised the series before 1993 so that 
the break is no longer visible in the labor force partipation rate and in the 
unemployment rate.9
Figure 6.5 shows the labor force participation rate for young workers 
and older workers and the unemployment rate for the young for the period 
from 1977 to 2004. The vertical bars refer to the years of the social security 
reforms. The unemployment rate is deﬁ  ned in the usual way as the ratio 
between the unemployed and the active people. Hence, this rate is more sen-
sitive to business cycle ﬂ  uctuations than the employment rate, particularly 
for young people.
The descriptive evidence suggests that there is no simple relationship 
between the labor force participation rate of the old and the unemployment 
rate of the young. In the 1970s and 1980s, the labor force participation of the 
old declined steadily, while the unemployment rate of the young increased. 
It is only in recent years that the eﬀect of the social security reforms are 
9. We are grateful to the Italian Statistical Oﬃce (ISTAT) for allowing us access to the 
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felt: a reversal of the declining trend in labor force participation is ob-
served for the age group ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  four (i.e., workers for which the 
age limits to access early retirement have gradually become binding) around 
the year 2000.10
Overall, these trends suggest that the reforms had some impact: the youth 
unemployment rates decreased after 1997, while social security reforms 
increased labor force participation amongst the older workers.
There is no evidence of substitutability between older workers and younger 
workers. If anything, the two time series seem to be positively correlated: 
when the unemployment rate of the young increases, there are also more 
older workers leaving the labor market. The evidence of procyclical behavior 
is also conﬁ  rmed by the time series of youth labor force participation.
The aggregate ﬁ  gures, however, conceal important gender diﬀerences. 
Figures 6.6 and 6.7 present times series evidence that distinguishes between 
male workers (ﬁ  gure 6.6) and female workers (ﬁ  gure 6.7). The unemploy-
ment rate of the young shows the same trends and cycles for males and 
females, with higher levels of unemployment for females in each year. The 
labor force participation of older workers also shows marked gender dif-
ferences: male workers in the age group ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  four exit the labor 
force at an increasing rate over time, apart from the reversal in the trend after 
Fig. 6.5    Trends of labor force participation of young and old workers compared to 
the unemployment rate of the young
10. In the appendix, the same rates are presented in index form, where 1977 is the base year 
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the year 2000; for female workers of the same age group, the time series is 
ﬂ  at or even increasing due to relevant cohort eﬀects.
Figure 6.8 shows the same patterns, but the emphasis is on the trend 
in the unemployment rate of prime age workers (age twenty-  ﬁ  ve to ﬁ  fty-
  four). For this age group, the unemployment rate is at a much lower level, 
hence conﬁ  rming that youth unemployment is the main determinant of total 
unemployment (see also ﬁ  gures 6.9 and 6.10).
Fig. 6.6    Trends of labor force participation of young and old workers compared to 
the unemployment rate of the young: Males
Fig. 6.7    Trends of labor force participation of young and old workers compared to 
the unemployment rate of the young: FemalesYouth Unemployment and Retirement of the Elderly: The Case of Italy    1 8 1
Figure 6.11 stresses once more that the labor force participation of the 
younger group and of the older group are procyclical. The decline in labor 
force participation of the young occurring in the late 1980s and early 1990s is 
largely due to increasing participation in schooling and to the rigidity of the 
labor market in those years. Only in recent years is the labor force participa-
tion rate of the elderly reversing the trend thanks to the pension reforms. 
Fig. 6.8    Trends in the labor force participation rate of the old and unemployment 
rate of the young and prime age
Fig. 6.9    Trends in the labor force participation rate of the old and unemployment 
rate of the young and prime age: Males182        Agar Brugiavini and Franco Peracchi
For these trends, too, there is a clear gender diﬀerence: due to cohort eﬀects, 
there is a growth in older female workers after the year 1997. For younger 
females, the pattern is similar to that observed for younger males, as school-
ing also plays an important role in this case (see ﬁ  gures 6.12 and 6.13).
As for the exits from the labor force, Italy has two main routes: old-  age 
Fig. 6.10    Trends in the labor force participation rate of the old and unemployment 
rate of the young and prime age: Females
Fig. 6.11    Trends in the labor force participation rate of the old, the young, and the 
prime age groupYouth Unemployment and Retirement of the Elderly: The Case of Italy    1 8 3
and early retirement. Invalidity pensions were relevant until the beginning 
of the 1980s, but regulation on access to invalidity beneﬁ  ts became much 
stricter in those years, and the inﬂ  ow of such beneﬁ  ts was driven down to 
very small numbers within a ten-  year period.
Figure 6.14 shows the composition of the stock of outstanding beneﬁ  ts 
Fig. 6.12    Trends in the labor force participation rate of the old, the young, and the 
prime age group: Males
Fig. 6.13    Trends in the labor force participation rate of the old, the young, and the 
prime age group: Females184        Agar Brugiavini and Franco Peracchi
by type of beneﬁ  t and year.11 The stock of disability (invalidity) pensions is 
very high until 1984, but it goes down slowly over time as beneﬁ  ciaries age 
and eventually die.
Figures 6.15 and 6.16 show the evolution of the stock of early retirement/
old- age beneﬁ   ts. From the year 2000, we can distinguish by age class. Under 
the assumption that in the age brackets ﬁ  fty to ﬁ  fty-  four and ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to 
ﬁ  fty-  nine we ﬁ  nd early retirement beneﬁ  ts and that in some cases these are 
also claimed between the ages sixty and sixty- four, one can draw the conclu-
sion that the restrictions on eligibility rules for early retirement have indeed 
been biting in recent years.
6.6    Incentives  to  Retire
In order to capture the eﬀects of changes in legislation, particularly the 
eﬀects of pension reforms, we compare the time series behavior of the incen-
tives with that of the labor force.
We develop a simulation method to construct our incentive measures: 
this way, we can embed, in each year, legislated changes in the social secu-
rity system (i.e., changes to beneﬁ  t calculation and eligibility rules) while at 
Fig.  6.14  Beneﬁ   t  recipients  by  type  of  beneﬁ   t  and  year
11. ISTAT, Casellario delle Pensioni.Fig. 6.15    Number of recipients of early retirement/old-  age social security
Fig. 6.16    Number of recipients of early retirement/old-  age social security186        Agar Brugiavini and Franco Peracchi
the same time avoiding the endogeneity problems contaminating the actual 
social security data series.
In order to carry out this simulation (based on Brugiavini and Peracchi 
[2005]), we make use of the SHIW data, which contains detailed information 
on the personal characteristics that are needed to compute or approximate 
pension beneﬁ  ts under the various regimes.
6.6.1    The  SHIW  Data
The SHIW is a repeated cross-  sectional survey that was ﬁ  rst conducted 
in 1965. It was carried out annually until 1987 (except for 1985), then every 
two years until 1995, and then again in 1998, 2000, and 2002, the last used 
in this chapter. The 2002 survey covers about 8,000 households and 21,000 
people. From 1989, the survey also contains a panel component. Currently, 
about half of the sample (4,000 households in all) is included in the panel. 
In this chapter, we use the historical database (Bank of Italy 2004), which 
contains the harmonized microlevel data for the whole period from 1977 
to 2002.
The survey units are de facto households. All household members (includ-
ing those aged less than ﬁ  fteen) are asked to indicate their income in the 
year before the survey. Questions about the household are submitted to 
the head of the household (see also the appendix for details). Because of 
oversampling of certain population strata in some years (especially in 1987) 
and diﬀerential nonresponse and attrition rates, it is crucial to use the survey 
weights when estimating population features such as means, variances, and 
percentiles.
The quantity and quality of the information collected by the survey in-
creased over time. For example, until 1983, age was only recorded in broadly 
deﬁ  ned brackets. From 1984, age has been recorded in years, so one can study 
the behavior of birth cohorts deﬁ  ned by single years of age. Until 1989, little 
information was available for those who did not receive any income. Basi-
cally, only gender, age, relationship to the head, and main activity (house-
wife, student, etc.) were recorded, but there was no information on, for ex-
ample, educational attainments and marital status. The frequent changes in 
the deﬁ  nitions complicate the task of constructing time- consistent measures. 
This is particularly true for variables such as the schooling level, the sector 
of employment, and the type of job. However, the “historical archive” of the 
Bank of Italy provides harmonized measures that mostly overcome these 
problems for the purpose of this study.
6.6.2    Incentive  Measures
Before turning to the simulation methodology, we look at a simple mea-
sure capturing changes in eligibility rules: this is the sum of minimum age 
requirements and the number of years of seniority necessary to apply for an 
early retirement beneﬁ  t. In fact, workers could retire in Italy either when they Youth Unemployment and Retirement of the Elderly: The Case of Italy    1 8 7
reached a certain age (the legal retirement age for old-  age beneﬁ  ts, which 
is now sixty-  ﬁ  ve for men) or a certain number of years of contribution (for 
example, any age if forty years of contribution had been completed) or a 
combination of the two (for example, ﬁ  fty- seven years of age and thirty- ﬁ  ve 
years of contribution). We call this sum the “quota”: before 1995, the quota 
was not deﬁ  ned, as individuals could retire at any age. It was introduced 
in 1995 at level eighty-  three and increased gradually thereafter.
Figure 6.17 shows the relationship between the unemployment rate of the 
young, the employment rate of the old, and the “quota” variable. The quota 
“index” keeps growing until the most recent years, while the unemployment 
rate of the young shows a relevant swing. The jump in the “quota” indicator 
anticipates by a few years the rise in employment of the old group.
Because the “quota” variable is a rather rough measure of the complex 
ﬁ  nancial incentives of the social security system, we construct a set of incen-
tive measures that capture diﬀerent dynamic features of the social security 
system.
6.6.3      Social Security Wealth and Incentives
The SHIW sample offers considerable variation, which reﬂ  ects both the 
diﬀerences in individual characteristics and the diﬀerent rules of the pension 
system for diﬀerent categories of workers: private- sector employees, public-
Fig. 6.17    Trends in the unemployment rate of the young, the employment rate of 
the old, and the “quota” variable188        Agar Brugiavini and Franco Peracchi
 sector employees, and the self- employed (in this chapter, we refer to these as 
“employment types” or simply “jobs”).
To compute the simulated beneﬁ  ts, we start from the proﬁ  le of median 
earnings for a given cohort. As in Brugiavini and Peracchi (2004), we focus 
on cohorts born before the Second World War; in particular, individuals 
born in 1938 and 1939. We estimate their earnings proﬁ  les by gender and by 
employment type (private employee, public employee, and self-  employed). 
We then smooth the earnings proﬁ  les by means of age polynomials and also 
by nonparametric smoothers. The same estimated earnings proﬁ  le is then 
imputed (taking account of the relevant job-  gender group) for all members 
of that group. Productivity growth of the diﬀerent cohorts is attributed by 
shifting the age proﬁ  le.12
Simulated beneﬁ  ts are obtained by applying the prevailing legislation for 
each employment type, taking account also of eligibility rules. For example, 
we model the reform of 1992 (implemented in 1993) known as the “Amato” 
reform as follows. Changes aﬀected both currently retired people (through 
a reduced indexation based on inﬂ  ation only) and future retirees through 
changes in the beneﬁ  t calculation, eligibility rules, and indexation of future 
beneﬁ  ts (see Brugiavini and Peracchi [2004] for details). Hence, eﬀects on 
current variables, such as social security beneﬁ  ts, are immediately captured 
after 1992, both because of the eﬀects on pensioners and because of the 
changes (gradually less and less generous) to newly awarded beneﬁ  ts during 
the transitional period. It should be noted that there are diﬀerences both 
in the way rules changed for diﬀerent types of employees and in the way 
these changes impacted individual behavior (e.g., consumption), because 
these groups of the population started from diﬀerent conditions (public-
  sector employees had more generous pensions to start with). All monetary 
amounts are measured in euros at constant 2005 prices.
Although several changes have been made to the beneﬁ  t computation 
rules, eligibility rules remained almost unchanged in the relevant years until 
the 1992 reform. Also, the existence of a generous early retirement option 
allowed retirees to have plenty of ﬂ  exibility on the timing of retirement, so 
the introductions of more restrictive eligibility rules in the early 1990s had 
little impact on the current cohorts of retirees. The eﬀects of the minimum 
requirements have been felt more recently, especially for the younger old.
Figure 6.18 provides a graphical representation of social security wealth 
by year and cohort for a hypothetical “median wage earner” of that cohort. 
The cohort-  speciﬁ  c time series are obtained as weighted averages of the 
social security wealth of men and women of diﬀerent employment type.
12. Growth rates in earnings for the diﬀerent cohorts are computed on the basis of two 
sources: Rossi, Sorgato, and Toniolo (1993) for the data before 1990 and the SHIW data set 
for the more recent years.Youth Unemployment and Retirement of the Elderly: The Case of Italy    1 8 9
For each cohort, the pattern is generally hump- shaped; that is, social secu-
rity wealth (W) reaches a peak at some eligible age, and it then declines there-
after. Besides a secular increasing trend in the level of W, one can observe 
also a corresponding trend toward larger dispersion: after the reforms of the 
1990s, W starts at a lower level and reaches a peak at a much older age. Part 
of this variability across cohorts is also due to changes in productivity and 
in mortality.13 It is clear that changes in eligibility conditions, particularly the 
minimum age requirement for access to early retirement, play an important 
role in shaping the SSW proﬁ  le. Changes in the beneﬁ  t computation rules 
occurring after 1992 explain why retirees who claim early retirement would 
have low beneﬁ  ts due to lower average “pensionable earnings,” despite the 
lack of an actuarial penalty for early retirement in Italy.
When aggregating the age-  year values of social security wealth, one 
obtains a yearly index of the incentives faced by diﬀerent cohorts in that 
particular year. We make use of two incentive measures, both weighted aver-
ages: the ﬁ  rst one is called W  and is the weighted sum of W; the second 
is called I  and combines both the level of social security wealth and its 
Fig. 6.18    Social security wealth (W) by cohort and year (pooled data)
13. We experimented by ﬁ  xing both the productivity and the mortality probabilities so that 
the only variability is in the age- earnings proﬁ  le and in legislation. Important variability across 
cohorts is still observed due to the reforms.190        Agar Brugiavini and Franco Peracchi
peak value. The ﬁ  rst measure W  is a synthetic incentive measure that re-
ﬂ  ects the mean expected social security beneﬁ  t faced by each cohort a in 
year y:









This is the average value of W(a, y), the social security beneﬁ  t, between 
the year when cohort a becomes eligible for beneﬁ  ts and year y. Weights are 
based on labor force participation rates by year and cohort (data source: 
ISTAT). This formula is implicitly assuming that before age ﬁ  fty (i.e., before 
eligibility), the social security beneﬁ  t of cohort a is zero. The rationale is that 
W(a, y) takes into account the forgone beneﬁ  t by a member of cohort a if 
he or she decides not to retire in year y. Hence, if cohort a is not eligible in 
year y, individuals of that cohort have no choice of whether to retire and 
therefore have no forgone beneﬁ  ts.
The next step is to build an aggregate measure of expected social security 
beneﬁ  ts across cohorts for a given year. This is done by averaging W (a, y) 
over the cohorts’ population in a given year:
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where P(a, y) is the proportion of retired persons in the given year, estimated 
from the SHIW, and LFP is the labor force participation rate by year and age, 
taken from the Labor Force Survey. We regard age ﬁ  fty as the ﬁ  rst eligibility 
age. Because we exploit both gender and regional variation, this measure has 
been computed conditional on gender and macroregion and then aggregated 
at the national level.
Our second index is based on the peak value PV∗(a, y). The peak value 
is deﬁ  ned as the maximum present value of W(a, y) for ages greater than a. 
This may vary with y, and it may also vary with age in a given year because 
of diﬀerent earnings histories for the diﬀerent cohorts. The index I(a, y) 
takes into account both expected social security beneﬁ  ts and the peak value 
using a discount factor   and weights q, which represent the proportion of 
individuals in the labor force of a given age and in a given year (LFP):
(3)  I(a, y)   {W(a, y)    [W(a, y)   PV∗(a, y)]}q(a, y).
The peak value PV∗(a, y), consistently with the underlying measure W(a, y), 
is set to zero if the current age is below the eligibility age. The value of the Youth Unemployment and Retirement of the Elderly: The Case of Italy    1 9 1
discount factor   will be chosen optimally, as discussed next. By averaging 
over the diﬀerent cohorts, we obtain an annual time series I (y), deﬁ  ned as:
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The intuition behind the index I is to combine both the wealth eﬀect 
generated by the social security wealth variable and the dynamic gains from 
waiting to retire. It captures the trade-  oﬀ between a higher social security 
wealth W, which may induce the worker to retire early, and the gains from 
postponing retirement (W – PV), which represent the advantage of staying 
at work. The latter is discounted by the appropriate discount factor that 
depends on the impatience of the individual. If     0, we have the extreme 
case where individuals are so impatient that they do not take future gains 
or losses into account.
In order to obtain endogenously an optimal discount factor, we make use 
of two methodologies called, respectively, the iteration procedure and the 
regression approach. Both build on the simple relationship:
(5) LFPold,t    W  t    (W  t   PVt)    Xt   εt,
where W and (W – PV) are the two terms in the index I, X is a matrix of 
controls, and ε is a random error. The iteration procedure is implemented by 
setting     1 and letting   vary on a given grid in order to maximize the R2 
associated with equation (5). The value of   that gives the highest R2 is cho-
sen as the optimal  . In the regression approach, we instead let both param-
eters   and   vary freely and compute   as the ratio between the two.
Both indexes, W and I, are computed by taking as benchmark the earnings 
of the median worker, estimated from the SHIW.
Table 6.1 shows the estimates of these parameters obtained from the two 
methodologies. We also distinguish the case where workers are “liquidity 
constrained”—that is, they cannot access their beneﬁ  ts before the eligibility 
age, and therefore both W and (W – PV) are set to zero.
As it emerges from table 6.1, our preferred speciﬁ  cation (the one deliver-
ing the highest R2) according to the iteration method sets     1.50 both in 
the unconstrained and the constrained case.14 As for the regression method, 
we obtain opposite signs, which is counterintuitive, but these estimates are 
hardly signiﬁ  cant. Hence, in the remainder of this chapter, we focus on 
estimates of the incentive eﬀect on labor force participation obtained by 
setting   equal to 1.50.
Figure 6.19 and 6.20 show the time series of our incentive indexes. The 
14. It should be noted that in this chapter,   is exactly the discount factor presented in equa-
tion (3).192        Agar Brugiavini and Franco Peracchi
I- index is more hump- shaped, as it reﬂ  ects the dynamic in the peak value that 
emerges from ﬁ  gure 6.18. It is interesting to note that when liquidity con-
straints are introduced, the I- index is rather sensitive to this change, because 
for Italian workers, such constraints are binding by eﬀectively reducing the 
access to early retirement beneﬁ  ts.
Figure 6A.4 in the appendix shows the eﬀect of the diﬀerent parameter 
conﬁ  gurations on the index I: the higher is  , the more pronounced is the 
Table 6.1  Italy: Estimates of the parameters of the I- index
LFP old
    Gamma   Alpha   Ratio   R2   Ibar weighting
Iterating over alpha with gamma   1, with 0.25 intervals and regressing LFP of old on ibar
Unconstrained  1   1.50   1.50 0.8134 1∗W   1.50∗(W – PV)
Liquidity constrained 1   1.50   1.50  0.8038  1∗W   1.50∗(W – PV)
Time series regression of LFP old on W and (W – PV)
Unconstrained  0.2991315 –0.2480815 –0.83 0.8201 0.299∗W – 0.248∗(W – PV)
Liquidity constrained  0.7126528  –0.5474849  –0.77  0.7809  0.713∗W – 0.547∗(W – PV)
Note: I is divided by 100,000. The estimates of alpha and gamma for the regression method, though being of diﬀerent 
sign, are not signiﬁ  cant. Covariates have been used to estimate the best alpha, both in the regression method and in the 
iteration method. Covariates include: year, GDP per head, GDP per capita growth, median wage of the age group under 
study, percentage of people in school in the age group under study, and share of added value by industry on the GDP.
Fig. 6.19    Incentives to retire by year (W and I), no constraintsYouth Unemployment and Retirement of the Elderly: The Case of Italy    1 9 3
hump. The index W is dominated by the growth of the generosity of the 
system in the early years and by the fact that older cohorts started collecting 
beneﬁ  ts having completed full careers in the 1970s. The index W peters out 
at the end of the 1990s, both as an eﬀect of the reduced generosity and as a 
result of the demographic changes.
Figures 6.21 and 6.22 show the relationship between the index W of equa-
tion (2), the index I, and the unemployment rate of the young and of the 
prime age group. Although there seems to be some correlation between the 
secular trends in the time series, this correlation vanishes after the reforms, 
when the unemployment rates ﬂ  uctuate while the indexes decline steadily.
A similar picture emerges from ﬁ  gures 6.23 and 6.24, which relate the 
incentive measures to the employment rates of the young and of the prime 
age group.
6.7    Regression  Analysis
Our descriptive evidence shows evidence of a negative correlation between 
the unemployment rate of the young and the labor force participation of the 
old. We argued, however, that this correlation may just be due to the under-
lying business cycle. Incentive variables, which represent our “instrumental 
variables” in capturing the possible nexus between pension policies and labor 
market trends, also seem to play a role in explaining the behavior of older 
workers (but presumably not of younger people).
Fig. 6.20    Incentives to retire by year (W and I), with constraintsFig. 6.21    Unemployment rate of the young and of the prime age group and the in-
centive variable W, no constraints
Fig. 6.22    Unemployment rate of the young and of the prime age group and the in-
dex I, no constraintsFig. 6.23    Employment rate of the young and of the prime age group and the incen-
tive variable W, no constraints
Fig. 6.24    Employment rate of the young and of the prime age group and the incen-
tive variable I, no constraints196        Agar Brugiavini and Franco Peracchi
These questions are better addressed in a more structured fashion by 
resorting to regression analysis. In a ﬁ  rst set of regressions (referred to as 
“ordinary least squares [OLS] regressions”), we investigate a simple linear 
relationship between the labor market trends for the young (prime age) and 
that of the old. The estimated relationship is of the type
(7)  Yt        Vt    Xt   εt,
where Yt represents either the unemployment rate or the employment rate 
of the young, and Vt represents either the labor force participation or the 
employment rate of the old. In a diﬀerent speciﬁ  cation, we also model the 
percentage of young individuals in education.
The covariates are GDP, a dummy for the change in compulsory educa-
tion age, the median wage, the contractual wage (variation only over time), 
and the percentage of people in school. Apart from GDP, which is derived 
from the ISTAT Yearly Statistical Bulletin, all other series are derived from 
the SHIW data.
Results are shown in tables 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4. Table 6A.2 in the appendix 
also shows the results with the full set of covariates. We consider both a 
speciﬁ  cation with the pooled data (table 6.2) and one where we allow for 
gender variation and make use of a “male” dummy. This is quite relevant 
for Italy, as the graphs on unemployment and labor force participation 
rates show substantial welfare variation. There are four speciﬁ  cations for 
each regression: one is in levels, while the others experiment with diﬀerent 
lag structures. We also consider one speciﬁ  cation with no other covariates 
besides the labor force participation, one with a full set of covariates (includ-
ing median wage, contractual wage, GDP per capita, etc.), and one where 
we select only a subset of covariates (GDP per capita, GDP growth, and the 
share of GDP produced by the industrial sector).15
All speciﬁ  cations that relate the unemployment rate (or the employment 
rate) of the young to the labor force participation of the older workers con-
ﬁ  rm the descriptive evidence that they tend to move in a procyclical fashion; 
that is, when the labor force participation of the old goes up, the employment 
rate of the young also increases (unemployment decreases). These estimates 
are also signiﬁ  cant and robust to the inclusion of covariates. As for the 
young people in school, we ﬁ  nd mixed evidence: for the level speciﬁ  cation, 
an increase in labor force participation of the old is negatively related to the 
trend in school attendance. However, this result is usually reversed in the 
regression with ﬁ  ve-  year diﬀerences, suggesting that there might be a long 
wave in this relationship. Our view is that this result is dominated by the 
underlying increasing trend in schooling, which is little sensitive to business 
15. It should be noted that in Italy, there is no such thing as a “minimum wage” going back for 
the entire time period. This is mainly because contracts envisage only a minimum contractual 
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cycle variations. Interestingly enough, when we consider the employment 
(unemployment) of prime age workers, we ﬁ  nd a mostly procyclical pat-
tern: employment of prime age workers and labor force participation of 
the old move together. We run a simple “causality” test by looking at the 
impulse response functions of the unemployment rate of the young and the 
activity rate of the old in response to a one-  time change in GDP per capita. 
Results are shown in the appendix (ﬁ  gures 6A.5 and 6A.6): the unemploy-
ment rate of the young is much more reactive to GDP changes, but this eﬀect 
is not precisely estimated. One can see that both series respond to GDP 
in a procyclical fashion. In particular, the response of the unemployment 
rate is leading that of the activity rate, but the impulse response function 
clearly suggests that GDP is the main driver. These results are also robust 
to the introduction of gender variability (table 6.3) and regional variability 
(table 6.4). Overall, the time series of employment and unemployment of 
the young do not seem to be directly aﬀected by the labor force participa-
tion rate of the old; the “young in, old out” paradigm is contradicted by the 
data.
As we argued, there are potential endogeneity problems in relating the 
unemployment rate of the young directly to the labor force participation of 
the old. In order to overcome these problems, we also consider a set of speci-
ﬁ  cations where the main explanatory variables are the incentive variables. 
Results are presented in table 6.5.
Table 6.5 contains diﬀerent cases:
1. The  ﬁ   rst  case  is  obtained  by  choosing  diﬀerent levels of the   param-
eter in (3). This can take value zero (eﬀectively focusing on the incentive 
variable W only) or value 1.5, which is our preferred speciﬁ  cation. Finally, 
it can take the value emerging from the regression methodology (albeit with 
the wrong sign and not signiﬁ  cant).
2.  The second case is obtained by including liquidity constraints in the 
estimation of the index I.
3.  The third case varies with the use of covariates.
4.  The fourth case depends on the lag/diﬀerencing structure, starting, as 
usual, from the speciﬁ  cation in levels.
Results are very robust to the diﬀerent variants just described. By focus-
ing attention on the case where     1.5 and where there are no liquidity 
constraints, one can see that a larger inducement to retire has a positive and 
signiﬁ  cant eﬀect on the unemployment rate of the young (negative on the 
employment rate). Hence, incentives directed to the elderly have no beneﬁ  -
cial eﬀect on the unemployment rate of the younger generations. A similar 
lesson is drawn when the dependent variable is the schooling rate of the 
young. The only cases where some of the eﬀect is lost is when we resort to 
ﬁ  ve-  year diﬀerences (which reduces the sample size). On the other hand, 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0208        Agar Brugiavini and Franco Peracchi
force of the elderly, as the labor force participation of the older groups shows 
a negative and signiﬁ  cant coeﬃcient.
6.8    Conclusions
Italy is a country characterized by high rates of unemployment, particu-
larly for the younger generations. The generosity of the pension system prior 
to the reforms of the 1990s has encouraged many workers to retire early, and 
some policymakers, particularly unions, have supported the “young in, old 
out” paradigm. We show that for Italy, the “lump of labor” assumption fails, 
and we do this through two main routes.
First we show that the direct relationship between the unemployment rate 
of the young (age twenty to twenty-  four) and the labor force participation 
of the old (ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  four) is procyclical; that is, higher labor force 
participation of the old is associated with a lower unemployment rate of 
the young. This correlation occurs because both are driven by the business 
cycle. This result is very robust to the lag structure that we impose, so it is not 
just an artifact of the timing of the business cycle. It does not change when 
we distinguish groups by gender, given the important gender diﬀerences in 
labor market behavior.
The second route recognizes that the previous approach may suﬀer from 
endogeneity problems. Hence, we resort to a simulated variable, “the induce-
ment to retire,” which is constructed by simulating the social security bene-
ﬁ  ts accruing to the median worker, taking into account the relevant social 
security legislation. There are two versions of this incentive variable: one is 
simply the average social security wealth, and the other is an index that also 
includes the potential gains (losses) from postponing retirement; the latter 
captures elements of forward-  looking behavior.
We relate the unemployment rate of the young to these incentive mea-
sures and ﬁ  nd that a higher inducement to retire is associated with a higher 
unemployment rate—quite the opposite of the “young in, old out” story. 
The variables capturing the inducement to retire have a signiﬁ  cant eﬀect on 
the labor force participation of older workers. This eﬀect has the expected 
sign (the higher the incentive, the lower labor force participation) and is 
very robust to diﬀerent speciﬁ  cations, suggesting that Italian workers re-
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Fig. 6A.1    Prevalence of a secondary degree (diploma), university degree (laurea), 
or work for diﬀerent cohorts
Fig. 6A.2    Prevalence of a secondary degree (diploma), university degree (laurea), 
or work for diﬀerent cohorts: Males
Fig. 6A.3    Prevalence of a secondary degree (diploma), university degree (laurea), 
or work for diﬀerent cohorts: FemalesFig.  6A.4  Index  I for diﬀerent values of alpha
Fig. 6A.5    Impulse response function of the activity rate of the old (AR3) and the 
unemployment rate of the young (UR1) in response to GDP per capita214        Agar Brugiavini and Franco Peracchi
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